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Abstract: This paper presents the development of a SCADA system testbed used for cybersecurity 
research. The testbed consists of a water storage tank’s control system, which is a stage in the 
process of water treatment and distribution. Sophisticated cyber-attacks are conducted against the 
testbed. During the attacks, the network traffic is captured, and features are extracted from the 
traffic to build a dataset for training and testing different machine learning algorithms. Five 
traditional machine learning algorithms are trained to detect the attacks: Random Forest, Decision 
Tree, Logistic Regression, Naïve Bayes and KNN. After that, the trained machine learning models 
are built and deployed in the network, where new tests are made using online network traffic. The 
performance obtained during the training and test of the machine learning models is compared to 
the performance obtained during the online deployment of these models in the network. The 
results show the efficiency of the machine learning models in detecting the attacks in real time. The 
testbed provides a good understanding of the effects and consequences of attacks on real SCADA 
environments. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity; Machine Learning; SCADA System; Network Security 
1. Introduction
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) widely used by industries to monitor and control different processes such as oil and gas 
pipelines, water distribution, electrical power grids, etc. These systems provide automated control 
and remote monitoring of services being used in daily life. For example, states and municipalities 
use SCADA systems to monitor and regulate water levels in reservoirs, pipe pressure, and water 
distribution. 
A typical SCADA system includes components like computer workstations, Human Machine 
Interface (HMI), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), sensors, and actuators [1]. Historically, 
these systems had private and dedicated networks. However, due to the wide-range deployment of 
remote management, open IP networks (e.g., Internet) are now used for SCADA systems 
communications [2]. This exposes SCADA systems to the cyberspace and makes them vulnerable to 
cyber attacks using the Internet. 
Machine Learning (ML) and artificial intelligence techniques have been widely used to 
constitute an intelligent and efficient Intrusion Detection System (IDS) dedicated to ICS. However, 
researchers generally develop and train their ML-based security system using network traces 
obtained from publicly available datasets. Due to malware evolution and changes in the attack 
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strategies, these datasets fail to protect the system from the new types of attacks, and consequently, 
the benchmark datasets should be updated periodically. 
This paper presents the deployment of a SCADA system testbed for cybersecurity research and 
investigates the feasibility of using ML algorithms to detect cyber-attacks in real time. The testbed is 
built using equipment deployed in real industrial settings. Sophisticated attacks are conducted on 
the testbed to have a better understanding of the attacks and their consequences in SCADA 
environments. The network traffic is captured including both abnormal and normal traffic. The 
behavior of both types of traffic (abnormal and normal) is analyzed, and features are extracted to 
build a new SCADA-IDS dataset. This dataset is then used for training and testing ML models which 
are further deployed in the network. The performance of the ML model depends highly on the 
available datasets. One of the main contributions of this paper is building a new dataset updated 
with recent and more sophisticated attacks. We argue that IDS using ML models trained with a 
dataset generated at the process control level could be more efficient, less complicated, and more 
cost-effective as compared to traditional protection techniques. Five traditional machine learning 
algorithms are trained to detect the attacks: Random Forest, Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, 
Naïve Bayes and KNN. Once trained and tested, the ML models are deployed in the network, where 
real network traffic is used to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of the ML models in a real-time 
environment. We compare the performance obtained during the training and test phase of the ML 
models with the performance obtained during the online deployment of these models in the 
network. The online deployment is another contribution of this paper since most of the published 
papers present the performance of the ML models obtained during the training and test phases. We 
are conducting this research to build an IDS software based on ML models to be deployed on the 
ICS/SCADA systems. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief background of the 
ICS-SCADA system reference model and the related works. Section 3 describes the developed 
SCADA system testbed. Section 4 describes the ML algorithms and the performance measurements 
used in this work. Section 5 shows the scenario of the conducted the attacks and the main features of 
the dataset used to train the algorithms. Section 6 discusses our results and the interoperations 
behind them. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with the main discussed points and outcomes. 
2. Background 
In this section, we briefly present a description of the ICS-SCADA reference model and some 
related works in the domain of ML algorithms for SCADA system security. 
2.1. ICS Reference Model 
The ICS is a general term that covers numerous control systems, including SCADA systems, 
distributed control systems, and other control system configurations [3]. An ICS consists of 
combinations of control components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic) that are used 
to achieve various industrial objectives (e.g., manufacturing, transportation of matter or energy). 
Figure 1 shows an example of an ICS reference model [4]. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the ICS model is divided into four levels, 3 to 0. Level 3 (corporate 
network) consists of the traditional information technology, including the general deployment of 
services and systems, such as file transfer, websites, mail servers, resource planning, and office 
automation systems. Level 2 (supervisory control local area network) includes the functions 
involved in monitoring and controlling the physical processes and the general deployment of 
systems such as HMIs, engineering workstations, and history logs. Level 1 (control network) 
includes the functions involved in sensing and manipulating physical processes. For example, 
receiving the information, processing the data, and triggering outputs, which are all done in PLCs. 
Level 0 (I/O network) consists of devices (sensors/actuators) that are directly connected to the 
physical process. 
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Figure 1. ICS reference model [4]. 
As shown in Figure 1, Level 3 is composed of the traditional IT infrastructure system (Internet 
access service, file transfer protocol server, Virtual Private Network (VPN) remote access, etc.). 
Levels 2, 1, and 0, represent a typical SCADA system which is composed of the following 
components: 
• HMI: Used to observe the status of the system or to adjust the system parameters for processes 
control and management purposes. 
• Engineering Workstation: Used by engineers for programming the control functions of the 
HMI. 
• History Logs: Used to collect the data in real-time from the automation processes for current or 
later analysis. 
• PLCs: Act as slave stations in the SCADA architecture. They are connected to sensors or 
actuators. 
2.2. The SCADA Communication Protocol 
There are several communication protocols developed for use in SCADA systems. These 
protocols define the standard message format for all inter-device communications on the network. 
One popular protocol, which is widely used in SCADA system environments, is Modbus protocol 
[5]. Modbus is an application-layer messaging protocol that provides the Client/Server 
communications between devices connected to an Ethernet network and offers services specified by 
function codes. The function codes tell the server what action to take. For example, a client can read 
the status of the discrete outputs or the values of digital inputs from the PLC; or it can read/write the 
data contents of a group of registers inside the PLC. Figure 2 illustrates an example of Modbus 
Client/Server communication. 
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Figure 2. Modbus Client/Server communication example. 
The Modbus register address type consists of four data reference types [5, 6] which are 
summarized in Table 1. The “xxxx” following a leading digit represents a four-digit address location 
in the user data memory. 
Table 1. Data reference types [6, 7]. 
Reference Range Description 
0xxxx 00001-09999 Read/Write Discrete Outputs or Coils. 
1xxxx 10001-19999 Read Discrete Inputs. 
3xxxx 30001-39999 Read Input Registers. 
4xxxx 40001-49999 Read/Write-Output or Holding Registers. 
2.3. Related Works 
Cyber-attacks are continuously evolving and changing behavior to bypass the security 
mechanisms. Thus, the utilization of advanced security mechanisms is essential to identify and 
prevent new attacks. In this sense, the development of real testbeds enables the possibility of 
advance research. 
Morris et al. [7] describe four datasets to be used for cybersecurity research. The datasets 
include network traffic, process control, and process measurement features from a set of attacks 
against testbeds which use Modbus application layer protocol. The authors argue that there are 
several datasets developed to train and validate IDS associated with traditional information 
technology systems, but in the SCADA security area, there is a lack of availability and access to 
SCADA network traffic. In our work, a new dataset with new types of attacks has been created. So, 
we are providing one more resource to be used by researchers to train, validate, and compare their 
results with other datasets once our dataset is available. 
In order to investigate the security of the Modbus/TCP protocol, Miciolino et al. [8] explore a 
complex cyber-physical testbed, conceived for the control and monitoring of a water system. The 
analysis of the experimental results highlights the critical characteristics of the Modbus/TCP as a 
popular communication protocol in ICS environments. They conclude that by obtaining sufficient 
knowledge of the system, an attacker is able to change the commands of the actuators or the sensor 
readings in order to achieve its malicious objectives. Obtaining knowledge of the system is the first 
step in attacking a system. This attack is also known as reconnaissance attack. Hence, in our work, 
our ML models are trained to recognize this kind of attack. 
In [9], Rosa et al. describe some practical cyber-attacks using an electricity grid testbed. This 
testbed consists of a hybrid environment of SCADA assets (e.g., PLCs, HMIs, process control 
servers) controlling an emulated power grid. The work explains their attacks and discusses some of 
the challenges faced by an attacker in implementing them. One of the attacks is the reconnaissance 
network attack. The authors argue that this kind of attack can be used not only to discover devices 
and types of services but also to perform fingerprinting and discover PLCs behind the gateways. 
Hence, in our work, advanced reconnaissance attacks are carried out, and ML algorithms are used to 
detect them. 
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In [10], Keliris et al. develop a process-aware supervised learning defense strategy that 
considers the operational behavior of an ICS to detect attacks in real-time. They use a benchmark 
chemical process and consider several categories of attack vectors on their hardware controllers. 
They use their trained SVM model to detect abnormalities in real-time and to distinguish between 
disturbances and malicious behavior as well. In our work, we use five ML algorithms to identify the 
abnormal behavior in real-time and evaluate their detection performance. 
Tomin et al. [11] present a semi-automated method for online security assessment using ML 
techniques. They outline some experience obtained at the Melentiev Energy Systems Institute, 
Russia in developing ML-based approaches for detecting potentially dangerous states in power 
systems. Multiple ML algorithms are trained offline using resampling cross-validation method. 
Then, the best model among the ML algorithms is selected based on performance and is used online. 
They argue that the use of ML techniques provides reliable and robust solutions that can resolve the 
challenges in planning and operating future industrial systems with an acceptable level of security. 
Cherdantseva et al. [12] review state of the art in cybersecurity risk assessment of SCADA 
systems. This review indicates that despite the popularity of the machine learning techniques, 
research groups in ICS security have reported the lack of standard datasets for training and testing 
machine learning algorithms. The lack of standard datasets has resulted in an inability to develop 
robust ML models to detect the anomalies in ICS. Using the testbed proposed in this paper, we built 
a new dataset for training and testing ML algorithms. 
3. The SCADA System Testbed 
In this section, we describe the configuration of our SCADA system testbed for cybersecurity 
research. 
3.1. The Testbed Framework 
The purpose of our testbed is to emulate real-world industrial systems as closely as possible 
without replicating an entire plant or assembly system [13]. The utilization of a testbed allows the 
possibility of carrying out real cyber-attacks. Our testbed is dedicated to controlling a water storage 
tank, which is a part of the process of water treatment and distribution. The components used in our 
testbed are commonly used in real SCADA environments. Figure 3 shows the SCADA testbed 
framework for our targeted application and Table 2 shows a brief description of the equipment used 
to build the testbed. 
 
Figure 3. The testbed framework. 
Table 2. Description of the devices used in the testbed.
Devices  Descriptions 
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On Button: Turns on the level control process of the water storage tank. 
Off Button: Turns off the level control process of the water storage tank. 
Light 
Indicator: 
Indicates whether the system is on or off. 
Level Sensor 1 
(LS1): 
Monitors the maximum water level in the tank. When the water reaches the maximum 
level, the sensor sends a signal to PLC. 
Level Sensor 2 
(LS2): 
Monitors the minimum water level in the tank. When the water reaches the minimum 
level, the sensor sends a signal to PLC. 
Valve: 
Controls the water level in the tank. When the water reaches the maximum level, the valve 
opens, and when the water reaches the minimal level, the valve closes. This logic is 
implemented in PLC using the ladder language. 
Water Pump 1: Fills up the water tank. 
Water Pump 2: Draws water from the tank when the valve is open. 
PLC: 
Controls the physical process. The logic of the water control system is in PLC, which 
receives signals from the input devices (buttons, sensors), executes the program, and sends 
signals to the output devices (water pumps and valve). 
HMI: 
Used by the administrator to monitor and control the water storage system in real-time. 
The administrator can also display the devices‘ state and interact with the system through 
this interface. 
Data History: Used to store logs and events of the SCADA system. 
As shown in Figure 3, the storage tank has two level sensors: Level Sensor 1 (LS1) and Level 
Sensor 2 (LS2) that monitor the water level in the tank. When the water reaches the maximum level 
defined in the system, the LS1 sends a signal to the PLC. The PLC turns off Water Pump 1 used to fill 
up the tank, opens the valve, and turns on Water Pump 2 to draw the water from the tank. When the 
water reaches the minimal level defined in the system, LS2 sends a signal to the PLC, which closes 
the valve, turns off Water Pump 2, and turns on Water Pump 1 to fill up the tank. This process starts 
over when the water level reaches LS1. SCADA system gets data from the PLC using the Modbus 
communication protocol and displays them to the system operator through the HMI interface. 
There are other ICS protocols which could be used instead of Modbus in our testbed. For 
example, DNP3 is an ICS protocol that provides some security mechanisms [14,15]. However, in a 
recent research, Li et al. [16] reported that they found 17,546 devices connected to the Internet using 
the Modbus protocol spread all over the world. They have not counted the number of equipment not 
directly connected to the internet. Although there are other ICS protocols, many industries still use 
SCADA systems with Modbus protocol because their equipment does not support other protocols. 
In this case, solutions to detect attacks can be cheaper instead of other solution like changing the 
devices. 
PLC Schneider model M241CE40 is used in our testbed to control the process of the water 
storage tank. The logic programming of the PLC is done using the LADDER programming language. 
The LADDER language is not covered in this paper; however, more information can be found in [17, 
18]. The sensors described in Table 2 are connected to the digital inputs of the PLC. The pumps and 
valves are connected to the output of the PLC. 
4. Machine Learning Algorithms and Performance Measurements 
In this section, we describe the ML algorithms used in our work as well as the measurements 
used to evaluate their performances. 
4.1. Machine Learning Algorithms 
The ML algorithms can be classified as supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised. Each 
class has its characteristics and applicability. The discussion of all algorithms is out of the scope of 
this paper. However, we refer the reader to [19] [20] for detailed technical discussions of these 
algorithms. In this paper, we use traditional ML algorithms to detect the attacks. Our target is to 
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build supervised machine learning models, and we have chosen the followings algorithms for attack 
detection and classification: 
1. Logistic Regression [20]. 
2. Random Forest [21]. 
3. Naïve Bayes [22]. 
4. Support Vector Machine (SVM) [23]. 
5. KNN [24]. 
The performance of these algorithms is discussed in Section 6. 
4.2. Performance Measurements 
Traditionally, the performance of ML algorithms is measured by metrics which are derived 
from the confusion matrix [25]. Table 3 shows the confusion matrix in the IDS context. 
Table 3. Confusion matrix in IDS context. 
Data class Classified as normal Classified as abnormal 
Normal True Negative (TN) False Negative (FN) 
Abnormal False Positive (FP) True Positive (TP) 
In the IDS context, the following parameters are used to compose the confusion matrix: 
• TN: Represents the number of normal flows correctly classified as normal (e.g., normal traffic); 
• TP: Represents the number of abnormal flows (attacks) correctly classified as abnormal (e.g., 
attack traffic); 
• FP: Represent the number of normal flows incorrectly classified as abnormal; 
• FN: Represents the number of abnormal flows incorrectly classified as normal;  
Next, we present several evaluation metrics and their respective formulas which are derived 
from the confusion matrix parameters: 
• Accuracy: It is the percentage of correctly predicted flows considering the total number of 
predictions: Accuracy % = TP + TNTP + TN + FP + FN × 100 (1) 
• False Alarm Rate (FAR): This represents the percentage of the normal flows misclassified as 
abnormal flows (attack) by the model: FAR % = FPFP +  TN  × 100 (2) 
• UN-Detection Rate (UND): It is the fraction of the abnormal flows (attack) which are 
misclassified as normal flows by the model: UND % = FNFN + TP  × 100 (3) 
Accuracy (Eq. 1) is the most frequently used metric for evaluating the performance of learning 
models in classification problems. However, this metric is not very reliable for evaluating the ML 
performance in the scenarios with imbalanced classes [26]. In this case, one class is dominant in 
number, and it has more samples relatively compared to another class. For example, in IDS 
scenarios, the proportion of normal flows to attack flows is very high in any realistic dataset. That is, 
the number of samples in the dataset which represent the normal flows is enormous compared to the 
number of samples which represent the attack flows. This problem is prevalent in scenarios where 
anomaly detection is crucial like fraudulent transactions in banks, identification of rare diseases, and 
in the identification of cyber-attacks in critical infrastructures. New metrics have been developed to 
avoid a biased analysis [27]. So, in addition to the accuracy, we also used the FAR and UND metrics. 
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5. Attack Scenarios, Features Selection, and Evaluation Scenarios 
In this section, we describe the attacks carried out in our testbed and the features used to build 
our dataset. This dataset will be used in Section 6 for training and testing the ML algorithms. 
5.1. Attack Scenarios 
Network attacks on SCADA systems can be divided into three categories: Reconnaissance, 
Command Injection, and Denial of Service (DoS) [7]. Our focus in this paper is on the reconnaissance 
attacks where the network is scanned for possible vulnerabilities to be used for later attacks. 
Reconnaissance attack is the first stage of any attack on a networking system. In this stage, hackers 
use scan tools to inspect the topology of the victim network and identify the devices in the network 
as well as their vulnerabilities. Figure 4 shows our testbed attack scenario where the dashed 
rectangles highlight the vulnerable spots and possible attack targets in the system. 
 
Figure 4. Attack Scenario. 
Some reconnaissance attacks can be easily detected. For example, there are scanning tools which 
send a large number of packets per second under Modbus/TCP to the targeted device and wait for 
acknowledgment of the packets from them. If a response is received, the host (i.e., the device) is 
active. This attack generates a considerable variation in the traffic behavior which can be easily 
detected by the traditional IDS or even the traditional firewall or rule-based mechanisms. Figure 5 
shows an example of the traffic behavior when a scanning tool was used in our testbed:  
 
Figure 5. Network traffic behavior under easy to detect attacks. 
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On the other hand, there are some sophisticated reconnaissance attacks which are more difficult 
to detect. For example, some exploits can be used to map the network, and that results in an attack 
behavior almost similar to normal traffic. Figure 6 illustrates the network traffic behavior during 
such exploit attacks. As can be seen, the change in the traffic behavior is negligible under the attack. 
Thus, it is difficult to detect the attack. The use of rule-based mechanisms would fail because the 
signature of the Modbus and TCP traffic do not change, and the language used to express the 
detection rules may not be expressive enough. On the other hand, the use of ML can improve the 
detection rate as ML algorithms can be trained to detect these attack scenarios. 
 
Figure 6. Network traffic behavior under difficult to detect attacks. 
We conducted the following reconnaissance and exploit attacks specific to ICS environment 
described in Table 4. Details of the commands used to perform the attacks can be found in [28] and 
[29]. During the attacks, the network traffic was captured to be analyzed. We used the following 
tools to analyze the captured traffic: Wireshark [30], and Argus [31]. The captured traffic included 
unencrypted control information of the devices (valve, pumps, sensors) as well as information 
regarding their type (function codes, type of data). Table 5 presents statistical information about the 
captured traffic. 
Table 4. Reconnaissance attacks carried out against our testbed [29,30]. 
Attack Name Attack Description 
Port Scanner [29] 
This attack is used to identify common SCADA protocols on the network. Using 
Nmap tool, packets are sent to the target at intervals which vary from 1 to 3 seconds. 
The TCP connection is not fully established so that the attack is difficult to detect by 
rules. 
Adress Scan Attack 
[29] 
This attack is used to scan network addresses and identify the Modbus server 
address. Each system has only one Modbus server and disabling this device would 
collapse the whole SCADA system. Thus, this attack tries to find the unique address 
of the Modbus server so that it can be used for further attacks. 
Device Identification 
Attack [29] 
This attack is used to enumerate the SCADA Modbus slave IDs on the network and to 
collect additional information such as vendor and firmware from the first slave ID 
found. 
Device Identification 
Attack (Aggressive 
Mode) [29] 
This attack is similar to the previous attack. However, the scanning uses an aggressive 
mode, which means that the additional information about all slave IDs found in the 
system us collected. 
Exploit [30] 
Exploit used to read the coils values of the SCADA devices. The coils represent the 
ON/OFF status of the devices controlled by the PLC, such as motors, valves, and 
sensors [29]. 
Table 5. Statistical information on the captured traffic.
Measurement Value 
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Duration of capture (hours) 25 
Dataset length (GB) 1.27 
Number of observations 7,049,989 
Average data rate (kbits/s) 419  
Average packet size (bytes) 76.75  
Percentage of  scanner attack 3 x 10-4  
Percentage of address scan attack 75 x10-4  
Percentage of device identification attack 1 x 10-4  
Percentage of device identification attack (agressive mode) 4.93  
Percentage of exploit attack 1.13  
Percentage of all attacks (total) 6.07  
Percentage of normal traffic 93.93  
5.2. Features Selection 
Once the network traffic is captured, the next step is to select potential features which can 
distinguish the anomalous traffic from the normal traffic. The authors in [19] have selected 12 useful 
features for ML-based network security monitoring in the ICS networks. In [32], the authors study 
the potential features presented in [19]. In our work, we analyzed the variation of the features during 
the normal and attack traffic, and we analyzed those features that do not vary during the normal and 
attack traffic. Based on these prior works and in our studies, Table 6 shows the features selected for 
our dataset. 
Table 6. Features selected to compose the dataset. 
Features Descriptions 
Total Packets (TotPkts) Total transaction packet count 
Total Bytes (TotBytes) Total transaction bytes 
Source packets (SrcPkts) Source/Destination packet count 
Destination Packets (DstPkts) Destination/Source packet count  
Source Bytes (SrcBytes) Source/Destination transaction bytes 
Source Port (Sport) Port number of the source 
5.2. Evaluation Scenario 
After defining the dataset, the features are extracted as discussed in the previous subsection. 
Then, the data is labeled either as normal traffic or attack traffic. Following that, the dataset is split 
into training and test datasets. The training dataset is composed of 80% of the total data, and it is 
used to train our ML model. The test dataset consists of the remaining 20% of the data, and it is 
used to evaluate the performance of our trained ML model. We call this training and test phase as 
“offline evaluation,” because the ML models are trained and tested offline. Figure 7 shows our 
evaluation scenario. 
 
 11 of 15 
 
Figure 7. Model Evaluation. 
After training and testing, the trained ML models are created and deployed in the network. 
Then, their performance is analyzed using real network traffic. This phase is called “online 
evaluation.” We compare the results obtained from the two phases (offline and online). This is 
described next. 
6. Numerical Results 
In this section, we present the numerical results of  the attacks described in Subsection 5.1. 
Figure 8 shows the results about the accuracy of the ML algorithms used.  
The accuracy represents the total number of correct predictions divided by the total number of 
samples (Eq. 1). As shown in Figure 8, considering the offline evaluations, Decision Tree and KNN 
have the best accuracy (100%) compared to other ML models. However, the difference in the 
accuracy is small among all trained models. In other words, all chosen ML algorithms performed 
well in terms of accuracy during the offline phase. During the online phase, Decision Tree, Random 
Forest, Naïve Bayes and Logistic Regression have a small difference, hence, the performance of 
these algorithms, in both phases (offline and online), are similar. The same does not happen with 
the KNN model. There is a significant difference between the online and offline phase which 
indicates that in practice the KNN does not provide good accuracy. 
 
Figure 8. Accuracy results. 
As shown in Table 5, our dataset is unbalanced. Therefore, accuracy is not the ideal measure to 
evaluate the performance [33]. Other metrics are needed to compare the performance of the ML 
algorithms. Figure 9 shows the False Alarm Rate results. The FAR metric is the percentage of the 
regular traffic which has been misclassified as anomalous by the model (Eq. 2). 
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Figure 9. False alarm rate results. 
Regarding the offline and online evaluations, as shown in Figure 9, Random Forest and 
Decision Tree models have the best performance followed by the KNN model. These three models 
have the lowest false alarm percentages followed by the Logistical Regression and Naïve Bayes. 
These lowest percentages mean that Random Forest, Decision Tree, and KNN perform better in 
detecting normal traffic. In our dataset, normal traffic is the dominant traffic; therefore, it is 
expected to have a low FAR value. This low FAR value can be due to the model bias toward 
estimating the normal traffic perfectly, which is common in unbalanced datasets. Further, the 
clustering done in the Random Forest, Decision Tree and KNN models can be helpful, especially 
when dealing with two types of data having different network features. 
Figure 10 shows the results of the un-detection rate metric. The UND (Eq. 4) represents the 
percentage of the traffic which is an anomaly but is misclassified as normal (the opposite of the 
FAR). The traffic represented by this metric is more critical than the traffic represented by the FAR 
metric because, in this case, an attack can happen without being detected. Further, in our unbalanced 
dataset, the models are biased toward normal traffic and this metric would show how biased the 
models are. 
 
Figure 10. Un-Detected rate results. 
As shown in Figure 10, considering the offline performance results, the percentage of the UND 
is small for Naïve Bayes, Logistic Regression, and KNN models, and zero for Decision Tree and 
Random Forest models. That is, all algorithm shows excellent performance on this critical metric. 
However, considering the online performances, KNN model has the worst performance, much 
different from the offline evaluation. The same does not happen to the other models, where their 
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online performances are very close to the offline performance. This excellent performance shows that 
our selected features in this work are great as they could detect attacks even in an unbalanced 
dataset. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper presented the development of a SCADA system testbed to be used in cybersecurity 
research. The testbed is dedicated to controlling a water storage tank which is one of the several 
stages in the process of water treatment and distribution. The testbed was used to analyze the effects 
of the attacks on SCADA systems. Using the network traffic, a new dataset was developed for use by 
researchers to train machine learning algorithms as well as validating and comparing their results 
with other available datasets. 
Five reconnaissance attacks specific to ICS environment were conducted against the testbed. 
During the attacks, the network traffic with information about the devices (valves, pumps, sensors) 
was captured. Using Argus and Wireshark network tools, features were extracted to build a dataset 
for training and testing machine learning algorithms. 
Once the dataset was generated, five traditional machine learning algorithms were used to 
detect the attacks: Random Forest, Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, Naïve Bayes and KNN. These 
algorithms were evaluated in two phases: during the training and test of the machine learning 
models (offline), and during the deployment of these models in the network (online). The 
performance obtained during the online phase was compared to the performance obtained during 
the offline phase 
Three metrics were used to evaluate the performance of the used algorithms: accuracy, FAR, 
and UND. Regarding the accuracy metric, in the offline phase, all ML algorithms showed an 
excellent performance. In the online phase, almost all the algorithms had their performance very 
close to the offline results. The KNN algorithm was the only one which did not perform well. 
Moreover, considering an unbalanced dataset and analyzing the FAR and UND metrics, we 
concluded that Random Forest and Decision Tree models have better performance compared to 
others in both phases.  
Results show the feasibility of detecting reconnaissance attacks in ICS environments. Our future 
plans include generating more attacks and checking for the models’ feasibility and performance in 
different environments. Moreover, experiments using unsupervised algorithms will be done. 
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